SW Conclusion in Those Cases - 2

In the first place the amount given to be used at a particular precinct, was greater than was ordinarily necessary to defray legitimate expenses, and a potent fact, which may not be overlooked, is the denominations of the currency furnished by appellant to his workers, to some of whom he delivered as much as, or more than, $15. It consisted almost entirely of one dollar bills, which as we have said, was the current price demanded for purchased votes. Legitimate expenses could, in ordinary course, be defrayed without such meticulous preparation, but not so free from the task of making change and consequences of delay, and in transacting the purchase of a vote, and possible exposure incident thereto.

After all, our conclusion in those cases will establish that each case must be determined by its own facts and circumstances, as developed by the testimony. In some of them it will be observed we exercised great leniency toward the alleged violator and held him not guilty, when, perhaps that conclusion was against the weight of the evidence. In them we gave effect to the denials of the alleged violator, notwithstanding his manifest interest in the cause, and permitted such denials to overcome contrary convincing testimony pointing to his guilt, when possibly it should not have been done.

After all, the issue of fact involved in this character of case is to be determined upon the same principles as similar issues in any sort of case. In determining such issues we take into consideration well established rules of human conduct in similar environments and circumstances, and we see no reason why that same course should not be pursued in determining the sole issue under consideration arising in an election contest case.

Applying that rule for the determination of the instant issue, we find it most difficult to conclude that from the various acts, activities and conduct of appellant, he was not made aware that the money advanced to be used in his behalf on election day, was not to be used or was not used for the purchasing of votes in his behalf. To hold otherwise would not only be a departure from the universal rule for the determination of factual issue, but as we conclude it would also run counter to human experience.

Smith v. Ward Part 1

Smith v. Ward, 280 Ky. 173 (Ky. 1939).

This appeal involves the outcome of the last primary election, insofar as was concerned the nomination of a Republican candidate for circuit judge in the thirty-third judicial district, composed of Perry and Leslie counties.

There were five candidates, appellant and appellee; C.W. Napier, J. Asher and C.A. Noble. Upon returns, appellant received the highest number of votes and S. M. Ward the next highest. Napier was third. In due time there were filed two contest proceedings, one by Napier making Smith, Ward and Asher defendants; Noble intervened.

In the other action Ward was plaintiff and Smith defendant, and while there was no order consolidating the cases, it seems that they were heard together, and the issues of fact determined in each case on proof introduced in both. We are not to be concerned on this appeal with argument over pleadings or procedure, though appellant complains of irregular procedure, but in brief expresses willingness to let his client's rights stand or fall on the merits of his contention. Appellee accepts the challenge.

Although Smith and Ward had received a greater number of votes than Napier, the latter sought to have the court award him certificate of nomination, on the ground that his opponents had violated the Corrupt Practice Act, and that he was guiltless. After a great deal of proof the court, on September 14, 1939, adjudged in the Napier case that the plaintiff did not violate any of the provisions of the Corrupt Practice Act, and that the testimony shows that the defendant Smith and J. A. Asher each violated the provisions of said act, but plaintiff has failed to show that defendant S. M. Ward violated such act, and for that reason plaintiff is not entitled to any relief herein, and plaintiff's petition was dismissed. No appeal has been prosecuted from this ruling.